SUFFICIENT REASON AND THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR MONISM What is the role of the principle of sufficient reason in
Baruch Spinoza’s ontological proof for God’s existence? Is this role
identical within Spinoza’s early work on method, the Treatise on the
Emendation of the Intellect, and his magnum opus, the Ethics? This paper
argues affirmatively that the methodology employed within the Ethics is
consonant with that method found within the Treatise, and this claim is
substantiated through an engagement with the influential works of Don
Garrett and Aaron Garrett. It is also demonstrated through an original
reconstruction of the Treatise itself. In this reconstruction, basic premises
are identified which can validly prove Spinoza’s intended conclusion of
substance monism. It is finally determined that what the Treatise and the
Ethics share, specifically, is a methodology which begins with non-nominal
definitions that denote the real, sufficient causes of their respective objects.
However, at certain junctures, this methodology is expressed with greater
consistency within the Treatise as opposed to within the Ethics. Evidence for
this will be provided from the primary texts themselves and from the
subsequent analyses of Don Garrett and Aaron Garret as well.

SUFFICIENT REASON AND THE CAUSAL ARGUMENT FOR MONISM. -